Is there a realistic prospect for the restoration of relations between the Phanar and Moscow?

By Archpriest of the Ecumenical Throne PANAGIOTIS KAPODISTRIAS

The course of relations between the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the Patriarchate of Moscow has been tested repeatedly throughout history, culminating in recent years in developments that have revealed a complex reality in which ecclesiastical diplomacy, theological principles, and geopolitical balances intersect with intensity and instability.

The decision of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in 2018 to grant a Tomos of Autocephaly to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine was a decisive turning point. Constantinople regarded this act as a confirmation of its canonical responsibility and continuity toward Churches that originated from its missionary work. Moscow, on the contrary, understood this action as a challenge to its own ecclesiastical presence and historical influence.

The divergence of approaches between the two institutions does not concern only matters of canonical law or historical interpretation. It touches on the very way in which the two Churches understand their mission in the contemporary world. The Ecumenical Patriarchate maintains a spiritual and diaconal character, expressing the universal orientation of Orthodoxy, with ongoing engagement in inter‑Christian, inter‑religious, and environmental issues. By contrast, the Patriarchate of Moscow maintains a close connection with the political authority of the Russian Federation, a factor that significantly influences its stance and actions in the ecclesiastical field.

Thus, the issue is not exhausted in the Ukrainian Autocephalous decision. It reflects two different ecclesiological perspectives and two cultural approaches regarding the role of the Church in society and on the international stage. Moscow’s insistence on claiming ecclesiastical primacy on the basis of demographic data creates ecclesiological problems, since the tradition of the Orthodox Church has clearly secured the “primacy of honor and service” to the Ecumenical Patriarchate, not as a seat of authority, but as a coordinating center of unity.

The tension has also spread to other regions. The recent initiative of the Ecumenical Patriarchate to accept requests from the governments and faithful of the Baltic countries for ecclesiastical subjection to Constantinople has reignited Moscow’s accusations of “intrusion.” Yet historical memory shows that the Churches of those countries already had relations with the Phanar before World War II, and their incorporation into the Soviet Union interrupted their autonomy.

The Ecumenical Patriarchate continues to uphold a steady and responsible voice, commemorating the Patriarch of Moscow in liturgical services and choosing to respond with sobriety, theological precision, and canonical consistency. By contrast, the Patriarchate of Moscow has ceased commemorating Patriarch Bartholomew, as well as ecclesiastical communion with primates who recognized the Ukrainian Autocephaly.

The question of the possible restoration of relations between the two Patriarchates remains open. It cannot be answered simply in terms of optimism or pessimism. It requires mature ecclesiological reflection, a sense of responsibility, and an understanding of the historical course of Orthodoxy as a faith of reconciliation and unity, not competition and domination.

The Church cannot operate as a mechanism of power, nor be an instrument of political agendas. The Ecumenical Patriarchate, by its steadfast witness, stands as a symbol of this principle. If the ecclesiastical divide is to be bridged, it will not be through assertions of power or negotiation of authority, but through a return to common tradition, the ethos of humility, and the truth of the Gospel.

The message of the Ecumenical Patriarch is firm and internally consistent: Orthodoxy belongs to all, but it is no one’s tool. The Mother Holy Great Church of Christ of Constantinople, as the “ever‑crucified and risen,” has never adjudicated ecclesial issues according to narrow or ethnonational criteria. It does not seek vindication through power, but remains bread and life for the Orthodox peoples of the world, whom it serves “in unspoken sighs,” with steadfastness, silence, and self‑offering.

To the extent that the Russian Church chooses again to join the pan‑Orthodox conciliar discourse and the theological realism of the Church of the East, the conditions for restoration exist. Not, of course, in terms of denial of truth, but in terms of reconciliation in Christ!